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Abstract: This guide provides a critical review of the economics literature on the 
desirability and the effects of unbundling the local loop. Firstly, we discuss recent 
contributions, which aim to quantify the effect of unbundling regulations on the 
development of broadband services. Secondly, we review the literature on the potential 
impact of unbundling on investment and innovation incentives. Finally, we conclude this 
paper by offering some suggestions for further research. 
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nbundling of the local loop refers to a series of regulatory measures, 
aimed at providing access to the incumbent's local network. The 
most fundamental measure is raw copper or full unbundling. With full 
unbundling, the incumbent provides access to its copper lines. The entrant 
then co-locates in the incumbent's facilities and installs its own equipment 
(either for telephony or broadband DSL 1 services). With line sharing or 
shared access to the local loop, the same local loop is used both by the 
incumbent and the entrant. The incumbent rents the high frequency band to 
the entrant for DSL services and keeps the low frequency band for analogue 
telephony services. With bitstream access, the incumbent leases access to 
its high bandwidth architecture. Finally, with resale, the incumbent provides 
its broadband or telephony retail services to new entrants on a wholesale 
basis 2. 
                     
(*) We would like to thank Alain de FONTENAY for useful remarks. 
1 DSL stands for Digital Subscriber Line. It refers to the technology used to provide broadband 
access on copper lines. 
2 Note that all types of unbundling schemes are not available in all countries (see BAUER and 
de BIJL & PEITZ, in this issue, for more details). 
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Unbundling of the local loop aims to stimulate competition in the local 
loop. This has been its main goal, both in the U.S. (see, in this issue, the review 
of U.S. unbundling regulation by BAUER and in the European Union by de BIJL & 
PEITZ). Whereas the roll out of alternative local networks requires huge 
investments and takes time, unbundling allows new entrants to enter local 
markets and win market share more quickly. In some countries, unbundling 
was also viewed as a critical regulatory measure to ensure that new entrants 
could compete with incumbents in broadband services on a level playing 
field.  
However, in policy debates, it has often been claimed that unbundling 
could undermine the investment and innovation incentives of both entrants 
and incumbents. Eventually, unbundling could be detrimental to competition, 
by retarding the roll out of competing infrastructures inefficiently. 
A relatively broad body of theoretical and empirical literature has 
emerged on the desirability and the effects of unbundling the local loop, and 
in particular, its impact on the development of broadband services. In order 
to shed light on current policy debates, we believe it is useful to provide a 
review of this literature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing the 
papers that analyze the effect of unbundling regulatory measures on the 
development of broadband services. We subsequently present some more 
theory-focused papers, which study the impact of unbundling on investment 
and innovation incentives. We conclude this paper by offering some 
suggestions for further research. 
?  Broadband diffusion and unbundling  
Broadband diffusion has given rise to a fairly extensive body of literature 
in recent years. Some of these papers focus on the characteristics of 
demand, while others seek to analyse the impact of regulation policies and 
supply conditions on broadband penetration. Recent papers tend to focus 
more specifically on the interactions between intra-platform and inter-
platform competition. 
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Socio-cultural and demand factors 
Demand factors are traditionally characterised by demographic data such 
as, for example, age, education levels, revenues and the percentage of 
urban residents. The first empirical studies centered on the adoption 
behaviour of residential users by focusing more specifically on demand for 
internet access. As a result, MADDEN, SAVAGE & SIMPSON (1996) 3, provide 
an econometric study that offers a precise analysis of the influence of these 
demographic factors on adoption decisions by broadband households in 
Australia. Their results notably establish the positive relationship existing 
between education levels and interest in broadband. 
More recently, and in line with this research, RAPPOPORT, KRIDEL & 
TAYLOR (2002) completed the results provided by previous models by 
distinguishing between broadband and narrowband users. By using the 
model of discrete choices, they show that the revenues and size of 
households are demographical factors that better explain a choice in favour 
of broadband. To a lesser degree, demand for broadband is positively 
correlated to age. The results of this research are confirmed by a statistical 
study conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce (2002). 
A later study by KIM, BAUER & WILDMAN (2003) confirms the importance 
of the role played by education in broadband adoption behaviour and 
underlines the determining influence of the preparedness of populations to 
use advanced technologies, especially ICTs. 
HOWELL (2002) goes even further with regard to the need to account for 
drivers of demand. He very clearly explains the close link that exists 
between application development and broadband growth. It follows that 
pursuing an active policy in terms of applications requiring broadband 
accelerates penetration rates. In other words, it is the demand generated by 
the emergence of new applications in markets that induces substitution 
behaviour by consumers and therefore strongly contributes to the spread of 
the new technology. 
From this point of view, South Korea is an important example. Along the 
same lines, AIZU (2002) shows that social and cultural factors can sometimes 
have a much greater impact on the development of broadband than demand 
                     
3 These were the first papers on this topic. Other papers followed such as, for example, 
EISNER & WALDON (1999), MADDEN, SAVAGE & COBLE-NEAL (1999) and MADDEN & 
SIMPSON (1997). 
16     
and traditional economic factors (like economic and population growth rates) 
by comparing South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan. It is precisely 
these socio-cultural factors that make it possible to explain the amazing 
growth of broadband in South Korea versus Singapore and Japan. These 
factors had all the more impact due to the country's favourable political 
climate and the dynamism of its Ministry for Information and 
Communications (MIC). 
Supply conditions and traditional regulation 
Research by GABEL & KWAN (2000) completes these analyses of demand 
and socio-cultural factors by integrating the impact of supply conditions, and 
notably of cost factors. They support the standard results obtained in the 
context of models for demand and use and specify the key factors in supply 
that significantly influence broadband penetration. The most important 
supply-related factors that explain broadband penetration consequently 
include teledensity, which has a positive impact, and the cost of routing 
traffic towards backbones, which adversely effects penetration. In the case 
of competition in services, the prices of unbundled network elements (UNEs) 
represent costs for the competitors of incumbent local exchange carriers 
(ILECs). As these costs are very heavily influenced by regulation, their 
impact on broadband penetration depends on regulatory conditions. 
PRIEGER (2003) identifies three main channels whereby public policies 
can influence broadband penetration. The first concerns the use of 
traditional direct tools for promoting growth in broadband infrastructures 
such as tax breaks and lending programs. The second channel involves 
direct regulation of broadband access prices 4. Lastly, the regulator can 
influence broadband deployment via the regulation of basic services. 
PRIEGER (2003) is particularly interested in this third channel. He examines 
two forms of regulation: regulation by rate of return and regulation by price 
cap, and looks at how these regulatory conditions affect incentives to deploy 
DSL. The arbitrage is relatively simple. In fact, in the case of regulation by 
rate of return, the Aversh-Johnson effect applies to broadband infrastructure. 
In the case of price cap type regulation, the relatively low price of unbundling 
induced lowers the profitability of DSL. The effect of these regulations on 
DSL lowers incentives for operators of alternative technologies to offer 
                     
4 See the year (2002) for an analysis of the effectiveness of public aid for the development of 
broadband in South Korea. 
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broadband access. The results of the model indicate that, in the case of 
price cap type regulation, the aggregate effects on broadband penetration 
are favourable on the whole. This type of regulation also reinforces the effect 
of unbundling on penetration 5. 
CRANDALL, HAHN & TARDIFF (2002) also comment on the effects of 
regulation on broadband penetration. They notably insist on the negative 
effects produced by regulation on incentives for firms to invest in value-
creating services for consumers. 
In order to test the influence of public policies on broadband penetration, 
KIM, BAUER & WILDMAN (2003) constitute three groups of homogenous 
countries. These groups are composed according to their similarities in 
terms of unbundling and ownership policies and the separation of telephony 
and cable operators and of public policies promoting broadband. Their 
results show that the contribution made by demand and supply related 
factors to broadband penetration is very sensitive to the shape of public 
policies in individual countries.  
Intra-platform and inter-platform competition 
The unbundling of the local loop is a regulatory tool that was favoured in 
Europe and more widely in OECD countries. It consists of obliging the 
incumbent operator to provide access to its network infrastructures to 
competitors at prices and under conditions stipulated by the regulator. The 
growth of unbundling should therefore promote competition between 
services on the same platform. 
HOWELL (2002) highlights empirical evidence based on a study of OECD 
countries. He shows that the strong orientation of these countries in favour 
of growth in unbundling has had relatively negligible effects on growth in 
DSL services compared to countries that have not chosen to implement 
such a policy. 
ARON & BURNSTEIN (2003) look to estimate the impact of competition on 
broadband penetration in cases where a single platform is available, and 
then in cases where several platforms are available to consumers. Their 
results show that the presence of intra-platform competition has a negligible 
                     
5 This latter result confirms the arguments of LEHMAN & WEISMAN (2000). 
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effect on penetration, regardless of the technology in question (DSL or 
cable). The presence of inter-platform competition, on the other hand, 
significantly influences broadband penetration 6. These results place a 
particular onus on the effectiveness of a public policy that encourages 
competition through infrastructures and highlights the ineffectiveness of 
competition between infrastructures, thus underlining the inefficiency of 
discriminatory policies in terms of investment growth. 
As far as intra-platform competition is concerned, HÖFFLER (2005) shows 
that the gain in market share by the incumbent's competitors, even if this is 
sometimes major, does not necessarily have the impact expected on 
penetration levels. In other words, if we adopt the market share of competing 
local exchange carriers (CLECs) as an indicator of intensity of competition, 
intra-platform competition in terms of unbundling does not systematically 
lead to very high broadband penetration rates. On the other hand, HÖFFLER 
(2005) shows that inter-platform competition, notably between DSL and 
cable, has a significant effect on broadband penetration rates. Lastly, a 
major contribution made by Höffler's research relates to the analysis of 
causality between broadband diffusion and inter-modal competition. In fact, 
should we assume that a high market share of cable implies a high 
broadband penetration level or, on the contrary, admit that high levels of 
penetration encourage cable operators to enter the broadband access 
market? The results of the model would seem to favour the first outcome. In 
terms of well-being, the gains from a higher penetration due to inter-platform 
competition do not compensate for the losses due to the duplication of 
infrastructure costs resulting from the upgrading of cable networks. 
DISTASO, LUPI & MANENTI (2004) go futher in tracing the links between 
broadband penetration and competition between platforms. They construct a 
theoretical model that establishes a positive link between the stimulating 
effect of a reduction in the price of unbundled elements and the intensity of 
competition between platforms on penetration levels. This theoretical result 
of complementarity between intra-platform and inter-platform competition is 
confirmed by an econometric analysis, provided that the types of access 
offered by the two platforms are sufficiently differentiated and/or that the 
degree of relative concentration on the two platforms is not too high. 
                     
6 Remark that two competing infrastructures might share some facilities. For instance, in some 
countries (e.g., France or the US), cable and telephone networks share some conduits or poles. 
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?  The effects of unbundling on entry and investment  
and innovation incentives 
How unbundling affects entry decisions 
Unbundling of the local loop affects entry decisions in two different ways. 
Firstly, the terms and conditions of unbundling contracts influence entry 
decisions, i.e., whether or not to enter, and, hence, the number of new 
entrants. Secondly, unbundling affects entry strategies, and in particular, 
whether entrants enter the market by building alternative access networks 
(infrastructure-based entry) or by leasing loops (service-based entry). 
Unbundling affects the number of entrants 
Firstly, by giving access to the incumbent's local loop, unbundling allows 
potential entrants to provide high bandwidth services. Moreover, the terms of 
unbundling contracts affect the post-entry profits of entrants. The more 
favourable the terms of entry, the higher the expected profits and, hence, the 
higher the entry rate. In terms of social welfare, there is a trade off between 
the benefits of an additional entrant (increased competition and/or variety) 
and the costs (duplication of fixed entry costs). 
Box 1 - Unbundling may stimulate entry 
Let us assume that there is a large number of potential entrants. Entry is only 
possible by leasing lines from the incumbent, and the unbundling tariff is 
composed of a price r per leased line and a fixed fee f for co-location, command 
handling, etc. New entrants are symmetric. If n entrants enter, each entrant makes 
a profit of ( )rn,π ; a potential entrant makes zero profit if it stays outside of the 
market. We assume that profit decreases with the number of entrants 
( 0/ <∂∂ nπ ) and with the rental price ( 0/ <∂∂ rπ ). We also assume that, in 
addition to the fixed cost f associated with unbundling, there is a fixed cost F of 
entry. 
In this setting, assuming unrestricted entry, there is entry as long as an entrant 
expects positive profit from entry. Therefore, the number of entrants at the 
equilibrium, n*, is the maximum n such that 
( ) ., Ffrn +≥π  
Given our assumptions regarding π , it is straightforward that: the more favourable 
the terms of unbundling, i.e. the lower the rental rate r and/or the fixed cost of 
unbundling f, the greater the number of entrants at the equilibrium, n* (note that 
this simple rule does not give the socially optimal number of entrants). 
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Unbundling affects entry strategies 
When the entrant uses the incumbent's facilities, competition is service-
based and can be realized either through resale or through unbundling 
schemes. When the entrant builds its own access network, competition is 
facility-based. 
Facility-based competition is perceived as a necessary condition for long-
term efficiency (see BOURREAU & DOĞAN, 2001). This is because the 
benefits of flexibility and innovation obtainable under facility-based 
competition far exceed those achievable under service-based competition. 
Under service-based competition, the entrants rely on the incumbents' 
network for providing services, and hence, are restricted by the incumbents' 
choices of price, service and technologies. WOROCH (2002) points to this as 
a limitation of service-based competition and argues that service-based 
competition is, at best, a stepping stone to facility-based competition in the 
long run. 
Service - and infrastructure - based entry can be viewed as 
complimentary means of entry (CHRISTODOULOU & VLAHOS, 2001). In 
particular, this is true when there is some uncertainty over demand, 
technologies or competition and/or when experience improves efficiency. De 
BIJL & PEITZ (2004) propose a model of network competition with two way 
access, à la Armstrong-Laffont-Rey-Tirole. An entrant and an incumbent 
compete during T periods with 2-part tariffs. Network operators are 
supposed to be myopic, that is, they maximize flow profits at each period. 
The dynamics of the model come from the fact that the entrant's quality 
increases over time, up to the point at which it reaches the incumbent's level 
(the incumbent's quality is fixed). Using numerical methods, the authors 
show that a cost-based lease price is best for consumer surplus, but that it 
may reduce the entrant's incentives to build an alternative infrastructure. 
However, since a low (i.e., cost-based) price for leased lines allows the 
entrant to build market share and reputation gradually, incentives to invest in 
its own infrastructure may increase over time. 
Other authors argue that service- and infrastructure-based entry are 
substitute means of entry. For instance, CRANDALL, INGRAHAM & SINGER 
(2002) claim that mandatory unbundling encourages entrants to delay 
facilities-based investment. Using a statistical analysis, they show that a one 
per cent increase in the price of unbundled network elements relative to the 
price of building a line from scratch will lead to a 1.23 per cent increase in 
the ratio of leased to build lines. 
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BOURREAU & DOĞAN (2003, 2004) also provide some empirical evidence 
of the substitutability between service-based and infrastructure-entry in the 
broadband and long distance telephony markets. 
Box 2 - Service- versus infrastructure-based entry 
Let us assume that there is an incumbent and a potential entrant. The entrant is 
outside the market at the beginning of the game, but can enter the market, either 
by building its own infrastructure, or by leasing lines from the incumbent. The 
entrant gets a gross profit of Fπ  and incurs a fixed cost F if it builds its own 
network (infrastructure-based competition). If it leases lines from the incumbent 
(service-based competition), it pays a fixed fee f and makes a gross profit 
of ( )rSπ , where r denotes the rental price of a line. We assume that ( )rSπ  is 
decreasing in r. In this setting, the entrant prefers infrastructure-based entry to 
service-based entry if: 
( ) .frF SF −≥− ππ  
Given our assumption regarding Sπ , it is straightforward that: the more favourable 
the terms of unbundling, i.e. the lower r and/or f, the lower the incentives of the 
entrant to build its own infrastructure, rather than leasing the incumbent's facilities. 
Therefore, the terms of unbundling affect the choice of the entrant between 
infrastructure and service-based entry. 
How unbundling affects investment and innovation decisions 
The terms and conditions of unbundling of the local loop shape market 
competition and, hence, alter industry profits. This is because when the 
incumbent's facilities are subject to local loop unbundling, a higher rental 
price inflates the entrant's perceived costs, and reduces the intensity of 
competition (see BOURREAU & DOĞAN, 2005; de BJIL & PEITZ, 2004). Since 
unbundling affects industry profits, it also alters the investment and 
innovation incentives of both entrants and incumbents. 
Unbundling affects the investment and adoption decisions of the entrants 
Many policy studies discuss the possible effects of unbundling on 
building alternative technologies 7. For instance, JORDE, SIDAK & TEECE 
(2000) argue that mandatory unbundling distorts the investment incentives of 
                     
7 See SIDAK & SPULBER (1998), KAHN et. al (1999), and DUMONT (1999). 
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new entrants. In particular, they claim that unbundling delays facilities-based 
entry, because there are benefits to waiting, such as the reduced costs of 
technologies, new information regarding demand, technologies or 
competition, etc. 
BOURREAU & DOĞAN (2002, 2005) provide a formal framework to study 
unbundling of the local loop, which can delay infrastructure-based 
competition. They show that, insofar as service-based and facility-based 
entry are substitute strategies for entrants, policies designed to support each 
one of them may prove conflictual. In a dynamic setting, an incumbent and 
an entrant compete to provide high-bandwidth services. While the incumbent 
uses its existing copper local loop, the entrant can either lease loops (if 
available) or build its own facility to provide services; the entrant can also 
lease loops prior to building its own facility. The authors assume that the 
cost of adopting the new technology declines over time. They show that an 
incumbent facing the effective threat of facility-based competition can 
strategically delay facility-based entry by providing attractive terms of access 
to its facilities. The delay introduced is by virtue of a replacement effect, 
which may also affect the choice of technology to be eventually built by the 
entrant. 
BOURREAU & DOĞAN (2005) show that when the rental price remains 
constant over time, the rental price determined by the incumbent in an 
unregulated environment, is sub-optimally low and, hence, the new 
technology adoption occurs too late from a social welfare point of view. 
However, if the adoption cost is sufficiently high, so that there is no effective 
threat of facility-based competition in the near future, the incumbent is better 
off not unbundling its loops. 
BOURREAU & DOĞAN (2002) show that when the rental price can vary 
over time, the rental price set by the incumbent decreases over time, as the 
new technology becomes cheaper to adopt. The rental price should continue 
to decrease until the time when the entrant finds it optimal to adopt the new 
technology, regardless of how low the rental price is. Similar to the setting 
with a fixed rental price, unbundling with a time-dependent unregulated 
rental path may sub-optimally delay technology adoption. 
Apart from delaying infrastructure-based entry, unbundling of the local 
loop can also distort technological choices. JORDE, SIDAK & TEECE (2000) 
claim that with unbundling, the incentives to develop telephony services by 
innovative means (for instance, telephony over DSL) are reduced. 
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BOURREAU & DOĞAN (2005) show that the type (quality) of technology to be 
adopted may also suffer distortion. 
Finally, decisions to invest in a particular geographic area can be affected 
by the availability and conditions of unbundling schemes. In particular, when 
the unbundling rates are averaged, the incentives for an entrant to build its 
own infrastructure are higher in urban (low cost) areas than in rural (high 
cost) areas (see JORDE, SIDAK &TEECE, 2000, for a discussion). 
Box 3 - Unbundling may delay infrastructure-based entry 
Let us consider the same setting as in box 2, but in a dynamic framework. The 
entrant can either lease lines from the incumbent at the beginning of time or build 
its own infrastructure at a date t; the entrant can also lease lines until date t, and 
then build its own infrastructure. The fixed cost of an access network is F(t) and we 
denote δ is the discount rate. We assume that F(t) decreases over time t and that 
–F'(t)/e-δt decreases in t (this setting corresponds to that used in Bourreau and 
Doğan, 2005). 
Assuming that unbundling is a viable option for the entrant, if it leases lines until 
date T, and then installs its own infrastructure at date T, its discounted profit is: 
( ) ( ) ( )∫∫ ∞ −− −−+=Π
T
Ft
T
St fTFdtedtreT ππ δδ
0
. 
The entrant chooses T so as to maximize its discounted profit, ( )TΠ . Writing the 
first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to T gives the following 
condition: 
( ) )(r
e
TF SF
T ππδ −=′− − . 
Given our assumptions, the lower the rental rate, r, the higher the date at which the 
entrant installs its own infrastructure. That is, the incumbent can retard 
infrastructure-based competition by providing attractive terms for access to its 
lines. 
Starting from this point, Bourreau and Doğan (2005) show that insofar as the 
incumbent prefers service-based competition to infrastructure-based competition, it 
faces the following trade off: a low rental rate retards infrastructure-based 
competition, whereas a high rental rate increases profits under service-based 
competition. 
Unbundling affects the investment and innovation decisions of the incumbent 
Unbundling can affect the incentives of the incumbent to maintain and/or 
upgrade its facilities or to invest in new access technologies. 
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Maintenance of existing facilities 
JORDE, SIDAK & TEECE (2000) argue that mandatory unbundling 
decreases the incumbent's incentives to upgrade and maintain its existing 
network. Indeed, unbundling reduces the ex ante expected profits of the 
incumbent, because the incumbent cannot appropriate the excess return 
due to increased efficiency and, cannot gain any cost advantage over 
entrants, as entrants have access to the efficiency gains of the incumbent. 
However, BOURREAU & DOĞAN (2005) show that the incentives of the 
incumbents to upgrade their loops depend on unbundling requirements. This 
is because the upgrade improves the quality of service that can be provided 
via the copper loop, and, hence, the incumbent can charge a higher rental 
price. This implies an increase in the incumbent's profit flows during service-
based competition. Furthermore, it delays technology adoption, since the 
entrant has a smaller (or no) quality advantage over the service provided by 
the incumbent when it builds its own facility, and, hence, expects a lower 
profit flow in the phase of facility-based competition. 
Innovation 
JORDE, SIDAK & TEECE (2000) argue that mandatory unbundling reduces 
the incentives to invest in new and risky technologies. If innovation is 
successful, the entrant is given access at a cost-oriented price through 
unbundling regulations. If innovation fails, the incumbent bears the cost, not 
the entrant. Hence, ex ante, the incumbent's investment incentives are 
reduced compared to a situation without mandatory unbundling, to the extent 
that regulation does not internalize the costs of failed innovative efforts. One 
implication of this argument is that unbundling distorts the investment 
decisions of the incumbent regarding technologies that are less susceptible 
to mandatory unbundling. 
?  Concluding remarks 
This article provides an overview of the empirical and theoretical 
literature on unbundling. It focuses on the impact of unbundling on 
broadband penetration, as well as on the entry, investment and innovation 
decisions taken by the incumbent and new entrants.  
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As far as the impact of unbundling on broadband penetration is 
concerned, the literature, which is mainly empirical, indicates how 
unbundling, as well as the price of unbundled network elements, affects 
broadband penetration. However, it would seem that supply and demand 
factors also have a considerable effect on penetration levels. The most 
recent studies qualify the effectiveness of policies promoting inter-platform 
competition over the effectiveness of intra-platform competition from a 
penetration point of view. 
The literature that centres on the impact of unbundling on entry and 
investment decisions is of a more theoretical nature. It notably tries to 
assess the efficiency of competition between infrastructures and services 
respectively. This literature points to how the various arbitrages made by 
firms, incumbents and entrants are affected by the form of competition in the 
local loop. In general terms, the results obtained are relatively close to those 
of traditional literature in terms of innovation and R&D. They notably 
emphasise the importance of substitution effects on the technological 
choices made by companies. 
Despite the fact that this literature is relatively extensive, several 
questions still remain: how will unbundling affect competition in the end 
market? How should strategies of bundled service offerings be analysed in 
this perspective? What should we make of the role of public initiatives in 
terms of broadband? What is/are the role(s) to be played by regulation in 
unbundling when different levels of access are offered? De BIJL & PEITZ 
(2005) offer a certain number of answers to the first two questions. As far as 
the role of public initiatives and the regulation of various levels of unbundling 
are concerned, we shall proceed by raising a few points that merit further 
consideration and by suggesting areas of research that seem particularly 
interesting.  
Public initiatives and broadband 
Experiences and empirical analyses (GILLETT, LEHR ET OSORIO, 2003) 
show that the involvement of local government in the development policies 
of broadband has seen major growth in recent years. The desire of local 
authorities to become major players in the development of broadband 
access can largely be attributed to the expected effects on local economic 
development and the improvement in users' quality of life. 
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Moreover, public initiatives on a local level undoubtedly play a major role 
in the evolution of access infrastructures insofar as they influence key 
growth factors in various ways. Local policies influencing broadband 
penetration can be divided into four categories. Firstly, local government can 
accelerate the growth of broadband by acting as a major consumer on the 
demand side. It also wields the political power to change the local legislative 
framework and can act as a financial backer by awarding aid and subsidies. 
Lastly, local government can act on the supply side by investing directly in 
infrastructures. Such public intervention is nevertheless not neutral from the 
point of view of the conditions of competition in end markets, insofar as the 
conciliation of public objectives and private initiatives often result in complex 
arbitrages. 
This raises a certain number of questions regarding the effects of public 
intervention on private initiatives and on the growth of broadband. An 
important question is related to the effect of a public investment on the 
power of the local market. On the other hand, it is interesting to measure the 
impact of public investments on private incentives to provide broadband 
access infrastructures. In particular, are collective efforts to provide 
broadband substitutable for, or complementary to, private initiatives? How do 
decisions by authorities regarding the choice of offering end services or 
focusing their efforts on the wholesale service offering affect private 
incentives? 
Once the problem of the effect of public investment on private behaviour 
is raised, this merits closer examination of how such an investment is 
financed. From this point of view, it is worth highlighting at least two aspects 
of the question. The first concerns the way in which the type of financing has 
a lasting effect on competition in the end market. The second aspect 
involves the strategic interactions arising from the choice of a mode of 
financing in the framework of competition between local authorities. This 
analysis should lead to regulatory political orientations, which should make it 
possible to better co-ordinate local intervention policies in these markets. 
More generally, it is a question of analysing the impact of public intervention 
on a competitive market. As far as this is concerned, the literature on mixed 
oligopolies (CREMER, MARCHAND & THISSE, 1989; De FRAJA & DELBONO, 
1990; SAPPINGTON & SIDAK, 2003) offers an insight into the main 
consequences of such intervention on market mechanisms 8. 
                     
8 We would initially expect public firms to adopt less anti-competitive behaviour than a private 
firm insofar as its objective should not be to maximise profit. However, some theoretical 
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Regulation of different levels of unbundling 
The modelling proposed by BOURREAU & DOĞAN (2002, 2005) or by BIJL 
& PEITZ (2005) of the arbitrage between competition between services and 
competition between infrastructures is based on an "all or nothing" type of 
choice for the entrant: either it invests heavily and it is completely 
independent from the incumbent, or it invests little (or not at all) and then has 
to rely completely on the existing infrastructure. 
In reality, this "build or buy" type of choice offers a far wider range of 
possibilities. For broadband networks, the full unbundling, bitstream access 
and resale options imply decreasing levels of investment and differentiation 
possibilities for entrants. A new entrant can choose between these options 
almost at the level of each local area. 
The transition from a discrete choice (to build or to lease) to a choice 
from a menu of access offerings at various levels of the incumbent's network 
has major implications. Firstly, the players' strategies are more complex 
when there is a range of access offerings, instead of just a single access 
offering. Secondly, major questions in terms of competition and regulation 
are raised: how many levels of access are necessary? As the various levels 
of access are interdependent, how can they be optimally regulated to avoid 
squeeze effects? What is the impact of an intermediary market (whereby 
some entrants having chosen, say, full unbundling access, lease their 
broadband network to other operators that have chosen bitstream or resale 
types of access) on competition? 
To our knowledge, there is no model that accounts for this type of 
situation. A special case is the partial licensing model of BOURREAU & 
DOĞAN (2004). The authors study the conditions whereby an incumbent 
company with a product innovation provides a partial licence to an entrant 
competitor in the end market. The product is supposedly "modular", namely 
it is composed of a fixed set of interoperable modules. The incumbent can 
thus choose the proportion of modules that it wishes to licence to the 
entrant. Competition is characterised by the degree of differentiation 
between products, which depends on the proportion of modules that the 
incumbent and the entrant have in common. As a result, by selecting the 
level of access to its product, namely the "size" of the licence, the innovator 
determines the intensity of competition in the market. The authors show that 
                     
research explains why, in some cases, public firms can be more aggressive than their private 
sector counterparts. 
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the size of the licence increases when i) the development cost of the entrant 
to finish its product increases and when ii) the marginal effect of the size of 
the licence on differentiation decreases.  
This framework makes it possible to analyse a situation whereby a large 
degree of flexibility exists in the choice of access level. On the other hand, 
the authors do not include the possibility of several levels of access, the 
regulation of various types of access or the resale possibilities between 
access levels in their model. 
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